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“Shakespeare and War.” Drawing upon St. Augustine’s City of God, the basis for later 
just war theory, Gray argues that progressive optimism regarding the perfectibility of 
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misinterpretation. As Francis Fukuyama points out, present-day liberal democracies tend 
to follow Hobbes and Locke in attempting to “banish the desire for recognition from 
politics.” Shakespeare in contrast, like Hegel, as well as latter-day Hegelians such as 
Fukuyama, Charles Taylor, and Axel Honneth, sees the faculty that Plato calls thymos as 
an invaluable instrument of statecraft.  
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Shakespeare and War: Honour at the Stake 
 
My first memory of any kind of political event was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. I 
was eleven years old, and I failed to grasp its importance. I could not understand why the teacher 
had stopped class simply to watch people on TV tear down chunks of grey, graffiti-spattered 
concrete and cheer. As I was about to graduate from high school, however, seven years later, I 
thought I had understood it. The “Evil Empire” had collapsed; in the words of Francis 
Fukuyama, we had arrived at “the end of history.” For several generations, the men in my family 
had served in the military, and I assumed I would do the same. I would join the Marines; I knew 
that they would cover the costs of a college education, and I imagined running around playing 
soldier would be harmless; even fun. I had not been keeping track of events in the Balkans; the 
only warfare I had really registered in my own lifetime was the first Gulf War, a short-lived, 
triumphant joyride across Mesopotamia, supported by a near-unanimous global alliance. What 
could wrong? I thought. Communism lies in ruins. The time for war is over. Being a Marine 
would be a bit of a lark, like an extended Boy Scout camping trip. The worst that could happen 
would be some sort of clean-up operation, with yours truly as one of the good guys; the sheriff in 
the white cowboy hat (metaphorically speaking). To my surprise, however, as I was trying to 
figure out how to enlist, I was awarded a generous scholarship to attend Chapel Hill, one that I 
could not combine with the ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps). The offer was too good 
to pass up. Plus, I figured I could go to OCS (Officer Candidate School) after I graduated, if 
shooting rifles and so on still seemed enticing at that point. 
Once I actually got to college, my interests changed. Shakespeare began to consume my 
attention. Even so, I thought I might begin with this anecdote – a story of my own, so to speak, 
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“road not taken” – as a preamble to reintroducing some of the unforeseen events of the past two 
decades. Over time, these conflicts have begun to feel familiar. Yet they represent an ongoing 
and perhaps insurmountable challenge to what were once commonly-held expectations about 
international relations. Progressive accounts of history have come under duress: in the wake of 
9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Ukraine, Syria, and North Korea, not to mention Brexit, as well as 
the election of Donald Trump, the hypothetical “arc of the moral universe” toward global peace, 
prosperity, and justice no longer seems as plausible as it once did, in the years immediately 
following the end of the Cold War. I want to recover our initial reactions of incredulity, shock, 
and lingering confusion, as that dream-vision began to dissipate; the sense of surreal 
disorientation that continues, still today. Looking back now more than twenty years, I feel an 
eerie chill when I think how casually I assumed at the age of eighteen, never even having 
travelled overseas, that the world was well on its way to Kant’s “perpetual peace”; that joining 
the military, once the USSR had been defeated, would not be likely to involve any actual 
combat. Yet I was hardly the only one caught off-guard.  
In the academy, as in the world at large, the turning point seems to have been the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001.1 In the 1980s and 1990s, Shakespeare studies in the 
United States had been dominated by the aims, assumptions, and methods of New Historicism. 
From an American perspective, these decades were a time of relative peace; perhaps for this 
reason, as Nick de Somogyi observes, “despite its obsession with violence and power,” New 
Historicism “neglected the subject of early modern war.”2 The omission was perhaps inevitable, 
given the premises of this school of thought. A predetermined narrative in which the existing 
hegemon always triumphs is easier to reconcile to a seemingly unipolar world such as the one the 
so-called “Pax Americana” provided at the time, as the Soviet Union began to come unglued, 
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than it is to a shifting, multipolar balance of powers such as seems to be emerging at the 
moment; still less, a “hot” or “shooting” war with an uncertain outcome, such as we saw in WWI 
and WWII, and now again in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Likewise, the New 
Historicist template is easier to apply to desultory political unrest or doomed, disorganized 
uprisings such as Jack Cade’s Rebellion than it is to cataclysmic civil wars such those which 
overturned the Roman Republic. The Cultural Materialism that sprang up in the United Kingdom 
in the same decades, the close of the twentieth century, is more accommodating in this respect, 
insofar as it leaves the trajectory of political change an open-ended question. 
Part of the attraction of New Historicism has always been that by accepting the 
determinism latent within French antihumanism, especially, the claims of Foucault, its 
theoretical underpinning provides a consoling explanation for the perceived failure of various 
earnest, radical, sometimes violent attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to reshape society into a kind 
of secular paradise. What is to be done, when there turns out not to be a beach beneath the 
pavement? At what point does it become acceptable for the quondam rebel to give up and sell 
out? The utopian, Hegelian version of Marxism proposed by Henri Lefebvre and enacted, even if 
only briefly, by his students in the riots in Paris in May 1968 proved unsustainable; or at least, 
much more difficult to believe in, over time, than had been supposed.3 So, it was exchanged for 
the more sinister, Stalinist Marxism of Althusser, together with what Lee Patterson aptly 
describes as Foucault’s “nightmare,” a “totalizing vision of an entrapping world organized not 
primarily but exclusively by structures of domination and submission.”4 It was not anyone’s fault 
that the revolution did not succeed; it never could have in the first place. The powers-that-be 
always win; subversion is always contained. Precisely in those assumptions that distinguish it 
from other types of historicism, New Historicism is curiously, conveniently hopeless. As such, it 
5 
 
always struck me, even at its height, back when I was an undergraduate, as a form of what Sartre 
would call “bad faith.” New Historicism styles itself an act of courage, peering past the veil of 
“ideology” into the Nietszchean “abyss.” But it always seemed to me more like self-exculpatory 
therapy. Like other forms of antihumanist “critique,” it is the comfortable, default interpretive 
mode of what Nietzsche calls “the last man,” reconciling himself to the modern state. 
 As it happens, probably the best-known example of a New Historicist approach to 
Shakespeare’s plays does touch upon war, if only indirectly. In his essay “Invisible Bullets,” 
Stephen Greenblatt undercuts critics such as Hazlitt who see Henry V as “ironic,” as well as 
those such as Norman Rabkin who see the play as “radically ambiguous.” The problem with the 
play’s “apparent subversion of the monarch’s glorification,” Greenblatt argues, is that “the very 
doubts that Shakespeare raises serve not to rob the king of his charisma but to heighten it.”5 
“Actions that should have the effect of radically undermining authority turn out to be the props 
of that authority.”6 In Shakespeare Recycled, Graham Holderness pushes back against this 
alignment of Shakespeare with Foucault. Tracing changes in interpretation and performance of 
Shakespeare’s English history plays from WWII up through the Falklands War and after, from 
Olivier’s Henry V to Branagh’s, Holderness demonstrates that these plays “make themselves 
available for reactionary or progressive reproduction.”7 “Discrete and alternative positions of 
intelligibility” reflect “forces of liberty” as well as “forces of oppression.”8  
 Taking up and elaborating upon Holderness’ approach, research on the wartime reception 
of Shakespeare has become increasingly international in scope. The collection Shakespeare and 
War, edited by Ros King and Paul Franssen, includes sections on “translation and adaptation,” as 
well as “wartime interpretation,” focused on the effects of twentieth-century conflicts.9 In their 
collection of essays, Shakespeare and the Second World War, reviewed in this special issue, 
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editors Irena Makaryk and Marissa McHugh and other contributors consider the impact of WWII 
on productions of Shakespeare’s plays in Germany, Italy, Palestine, Greece, Poland, Russia, 
Japan, China, Britain, the United States, and Canada.10 In a special issue of Shakespeare, 
“Shakespeare and the Great War,” editor Monika Smialkowska and other contributors examine 
the “cultural mobilization” of Shakespeare for nationalist and imperialist purposes during WWI, 
as well as “challenges to such appropriations.”11 
In her essay for this special issue, “Shakespeare in Sarajevo: Theatrical and Cinematic 
Encounters with the Balkans War,” Sara Soncini looks closely at three productions that draw 
upon Shakespeare as a framing device for representation of the ethnic violence that broke out in 
the Balkans War: Katie Mitchell’s staging of 3 Henry VI (1994), Sarah Kane’s play Blasted 
(1995), and Mario Martone’s film Rehearsal for War (1998). As Soncini points out, none of 
these works actually show the Balkans War directly on stage or screen. Yet they each use 
Shakespeare’s plays as a “powerful conceptual aid to universalize the conflict,” as well as to 
address “their discursive positioning as outsiders and its problematic implications.” Mitchell’s 
staging of 3 Henry VI deliberately reduces the Wars of the Roses to a “matter of personal 
vendettas,” an “unheroic turf war,” akin to a present-day “low-intensity conflict.” By aligning 
her British “audience’s ‘here’” with “the Balkan ‘elsewhere’,” Mitchell undercuts “Balkanism”: 
“the systematic process of othering whereby, following the end of the Cold War, the Balkan 
region was constructed as an antitype of civilization.” Inspired by Shakespeare’s depiction of 
pagan England in King Lear, Sarah Kane, too, tries to “shatter” British “political complacency”: 
“the belief that the ‘tribal’ bloodshed of ethnic conflict could never happen in a civilized 
country.”  Martone’s documentary-style film, Rehearsal for War, is more metafictional; 
Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew serves as a foil to Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes in a 
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symbolic reflection on the practicality and ethics of responding to crises such as the Balkans War 
artistically from afar, as Martone himself, like Mitchell and Kane, hopes might be possible, 
despite the attractions of escapism. 
As Holderness argues in Shakespeare Recycled, changes in the adaptation and 
appropriation of Shakespeare’s plays over time help to reveal the variety of perspectives latent 
within their structure. Understanding those “potentialities,” however, requires some familiarity 
with their original context. Reception history cannot be separated from “the originating moment 
of a text’s production.” “Those formal and ideological characteristics and capacities inserted into 
it by the specific determinations and liberties bearing on its initial construction, are all that the 
activity of reproduction has to work on.”12 Insofar as we know, Shakespeare himself never went 
off to war. So, what were his sources? How does his depiction of warfare compare to the military 
theory and practice of his contemporaries? Paul A. Jorgensen wrote a pioneering book in the 
1950s, Shakespeare’s Military World, which sought to juxtapose Shakespeare’s “concept of war” 
with the “military treatises and newsbooks” published in England during his own lifetime.13 
During the Cold War, nonetheless, this field of inquiry fell fallow. Starting in the late 1990s, 
however, with the Balkans War, and with increasing frequency since 9/11, historicist critics have 
returned to the question. How did warfare in Shakespeare’s own immediate context affect his 
representation of it on stage?  
Like Jorgensen several decades earlier, in Shakespeare’s Theatre of War, Nick de 
Somogyi’s “chief aim,” as he says, is “to allow period’s non-‘literary’ texts both generally and in 
detail to further the interpretation of its drama.”14 As Patricia Cahill observes, “Between 1575 
and 1600, some fifty military treatises, both original works and translations of classical and 
Continental texts, were published in London, and several went through multiple editions.”15 
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Given, as he explains, that “Shakespeare’s was an era of siege warfare rather than mobile 
warfare,” de Somogyi is particularly interested in analogies between military practices and 
stagecraft: real and fictional “theatres of war.”16 Nina Taunton’s 1590s Drama and Militarism is 
more tightly focused; Taunton considers the actions of the earls of Essex and Northumberland at 
the time in light of theoretical debates about the “ideal general” in manuals on the “art of war,” 
as well as contemporary military correspondence, then turns to Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, 
Shakespeare’s Henry V, and Chapman’s Henri IV. Their inadequacies, she argues, reveal 
“hunger for a national military hero, a lion who would lead his army to glorious deeds and 
victory.”17 She draws analogies between “erosions of the masculine self” on stage and 
“anxieties” about “the erosion of national boundaries.”18 
Since the 1950s, historians of early modern Europe have debated the nature and scope of 
what Michael Roberts in a seminal article describes as “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660”; a 
paradigm shift driven, he argues, by the introduction of portable firearms.19 As Andrew Hiscock 
explains in his recent review essay, “central areas of discussion” within this ongoing and 
contentious field of research include “the increasing centralization of European states and the 
growth in their schemes of military expenditure; changing practices of recruitment, organization, 
and training of large-scale armies; proliferation in publications and manuals devoted to military 
practice; and, especially importantly, technological advances in firearms, fortifications, and 
logistics in this period.”20 One index of Shakespeare’s sense of this historical sea-change is his 
depiction of old-fashioned warriors such as Coriolanus, Mark Antony, Hamlet Senior, Hotspur, 
and Talbot. Their reckless, straightforward pursuit of individual martial honour is depicted as 
glamourous but obsolescent and at times more than a little pig-headed, leading to predictable, 
sometimes outright foolish self-destruction. The political order that these “alpha males” represent 
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is seen as on the wane: they and their kind are being replaced, slowly but surely, by cunning, 
cautious, slightly contemptible courtiers, as well as monarchical masterminds. 
Drawing on the same kinds of sources as Jorgensen, de Somogyi, and Taunton, and in 
keeping with the concept of an early modern “military revolution,” Patricia Cahill in Unto the 
Breach traces the emergence of “military science” as a “modern discipline” in early modern 
England. “By exploiting the power of the stage to shape the cultural imaginary,” plays such as 
Shakespeare’s English history plays, Cahill maintains, “helped to produce and circulate new 
regimes of rationality and abstraction”: “new military rationalities” regarding “the ordering of 
space, the disciplining of bodies, and the regulation of populations” led to “new understandings 
of personhood and of the body politic,” anticipating “nineteenth-century efforts to standardize, 
quantify, and appropriate the productive energies of workers.”21 Yet the stage, Cahill goes on, 
also registered “profound cultural ambivalence toward this new way of knowing the world.”22 
Drawing on the theorists such as Cathy Caruth and Dominick LaCapra, Cahill argues that the late 
Elizabethan experience of militarization was traumatic and that the theatre provided a reprieve: 
“a public space for the collective re-enacting of the incomprehensible and, with that, the 
possibility of a cultural ‘working through’ of what might otherwise resist psychic assimilation.”23  
In an article on Henry IV, Tom McAlindon connects the fifteenth-century rebellions it 
depicts to the Northern Rebellion of 1569-70, as well as the earlier Pilgrimage of Grace (1536). 
As McAlindon explains, “the Pilgrims were defeated in a notorious piece of treachery,” carried 
out by a trusted, temporizing deputy of the king; following the suggestion of historian Penry 
Williams, McAlindon sees an allusion to this incident in Shakespeare’s depiction of Prince 
John’s treatment of the rebels at the end of 2 Henry IV.24  In her essay for this special issue, 
“Prince John’s Negotiation with the Rebels in 2 Henry IV: Fifteenth-Century Northern England 
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as Sixteenth-Century Ireland,” Jane Wong discerns another such analogy, this time more 
immediate. Prince John’s violation of his promise to the rebels is a shocking episode, which 
Wong argues is best understood as “part of Shakespeare’s exploration of an immensely delicate 
system of exchanges between ruler and ruled.” More specifically, John’s double-dealing 
demonstrates the precariousness of the relationship between the king and his more distant 
subjects, given the long distances that separated more far-flung regions from the central 
government in London. Wong contends that English kings worked to destabilize local lords in 
order to consolidate their own authority. As an illustration, she looks closely at English efforts to 
undermine kinship ties between Irish chieftains, and in particular the fraught negotiations 
between Irish rebel Hugh O’Neill and representatives of Queen Elizabeth. As in 2 Henry IV, the 
royal emissaries argue that because the rebels broke their oaths of allegiance, they are not 
required to deal with them in good faith. The separation between royal seat and distant 
representatives allows them to break their word without impugning the honour of the monarch.  
Turning to the legalities of war in Shakespeare’s plays, the scholar who has written the 
most on the subject, Theodor Meron, brings to bear unrivalled and indeed rather astonishing 
professional expertise: in addition to his sideline as a Shakespeare enthusiast, Meron is Professor 
of international law at New York University, Counselor on international law to the U.S. 
Department of State and Israeli Foreign Ministry, former President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chambers of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and current President of the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals of the U. N. General Assembly. In his first book on 
Shakespeare, Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws, Meron uses Henry V as “a vehicle to 
analyse the issues of war that governed, or should have governed, that conflict [the Hundred 
11 
 
Years War] and to develop an intertemporal, historical perspective on the law of war and its 
evolution.”25 In his second book, Bloody Constraint, subtitled, War and Chivalry in 
Shakespeare, Meron explores the medieval development of a chivalric code that would in theory 
govern knightly behaviour, featuring ideals such as “honour, loyalty, courage, mercy, 
commitment to the community, and the avoidance of shame and dishonour.”26 He also 
acknowledges with dismay how these values were often violated in practice. Turning to 
Shakespeare’s plays more specifically, he concludes with the contentious claim that Shakespeare 
himself was a pacifist. 
In keeping with most international law regarding war today, Meron draws heavily on just 
war theory, as it emerged in the Middle Ages out of Scholastic reflections on St. Augustine’s 
City of God, as well as Cicero’s account of Roman law regarding warfare in his treatise On 
Duties. Paola Pugliatti explains this tradition and builds on Meron’s legal analysis of 
Shakespeare’s Henry V, turning to a myriad of other plays, as well, in Shakespeare and Just War 
Tradition, as does Franziska Quabeck in Just and Unjust Wars in Shakespeare, reviewed in this 
special issue.27 In her essay for this issue, “Shakespeare’s Unjust Wars,” Quabeck calls into 
question critics such Steven Marx and R. S. White who present Shakespeare as a thoroughgoing 
pacifist, as well as those such as Norman Rabkin who see his opinions about war as 
“undecidable.”28 Instead, she argues, just war theory provides Shakespeare with “a general 
framework for evaluating the ethics of war case-by-case.” What constitutes a worthy cause for 
declaring war (jus ad bellum)? What determines, morally speaking, how a war should be 
conducted (jus in bello)? Should a military response, for example, necessarily be proportional to 
its cause? Quabeck gives particular attention here to the problem of proportionality in Troilus 
and Cressida, as addressed in the debate between Hector, Diomedes, and Troilus. Seen through 
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the lens of just war theory, Quabeck explains, almost all of the wars Shakespeare depicts are 
“unjust,” in one sense or another, with the notable exception of Richmond’s deposition of 
Richard III, as well as Malcolm’s of Macbeth.   
In his essay, “Sine Dolore: Relative Painlessness in Shakespeare’s Laughter at War,” 
Daniel Derrin considers the problem just war theory is designed to address, the tension between 
Christian moral precepts and self-defence, but from the perspective of psychology, rather than 
legality. “How does a Christian society balance the need and means for war against a duty 
neither to exult in it nor to enjoy constructing an ‘honourable’ selfhood through the destruction 
of others?” The Christian soldier’s dilemma, as Derrin points out, is that he must somehow 
bravely engage in war without at the same time stooping to take satisfaction in “the pleasures of 
self-definition that military ‘honour’ can afford.” Derrin sees Shakespeare as working towards 
this balance through “criticizing laughter,” a form of poking fun which allows an emotional 
distance from what might otherwise prove troubling; even horrifying. Derrin locates the 
laughable in a moral deformity or deviation from “nature” that exists sine dolore, because it is 
without any serious consequence. The butt of the joke demonstrates “wilful ignorance of what is 
commonly known and recognized,” in this case in terms of moral norms. Comic distortions of 
the ideal balance between martial efficacy and Christian scruple, taken as normative, reveal by 
contrast how a Christian soldier should behave. As examples of various kinds of misjudgement, 
Derrin juxtaposes Coriolanus’ slaughter of enemy soldiers with his son’s killing a butterfly; 
Hotspur’s insatiable desire for honour with Falstaff’s cowardice; and Paroles’ betrayal of his 
comrades-in-arms with Bertram’s infidelity to his wife. In each case, what prompts laughter is 
the disparity between the moral ignorance of the character in question and the audience’s 
common-sense awareness. Using foils drawn from opposite ends of the spectrum of deviation 
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from the norm, Shakespeare implies a viable, admirable middle ground between Christian 
compassion and the demands of martial honour, in keeping with Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as 
a mean between extremes, as well as St. Augustine’s compromise concept of the “just war.” 
Is Henry V an ideal king? Or is he, as Hazlitt says, an “amiable monster”?29 One way to 
make sense of his ethical ambiguity is to see him as attempting to navigate between the 
incongruent claims of two rival ethical systems: on the one hand, Christianity; on the other, a 
political order driven by imperatives of honour. “If it be a sin to covet honour,” he confesses, “I 
am the most offending soul alive” (4.3.28-29). The fascinating word in that admission is “if.” 
Can the nobleman’s traditional pride in force of arms be reconciled to Christ’s admonition to 
turn the other cheek? Perhaps not. If a soldier takes no satisfaction, however, from success on the 
battlefield, how effective, if at all, is he likely to be, if he should find himself, willy-nilly, face-
to-face with a determined enemy? Falstaff is good for a laugh, but a worse than incompetent 
commander: his indifference to achieving any kind of victory with the soldiers who serve under 
his command proves just as deadly to them, in the end, as Hotspur’s recklessness would have 
been. Too little desire for honour is as just dangerous as too much. 
Like most of us today, Shakespeare seems to be deeply suspicious of the notion that the 
pursuit of martial honour in and of itself could ever be considered adequate grounds for taking 
any kind of military action. Men like Homer’s Achilles raid and plunder without pretext or 
compunction. To conquer is glorious, without further complication. For Shakespeare, however, 
as for Virgil, any honour that accrues to those victorious in battle must be weighed against the 
suffering which made that triumph possible.30 There must have been some sort of injury, or at 
least, some sort of threat: what in just war theory would be called a casus belli. Whether or not 
an effort to regain lost territory qualifies as such is debatable; the scene in Henry V, in particular, 
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in which the Archbishop of Canterbury tries to convince Henry V that his claim to France is 
legitimate is often played for laughs. But I often wonder if we are today too quick to dismiss his 
argument. Queen Elizabeth’s legitimacy depended, in part, on the same kind of discrediting of 
misgivings about women inheriting the throne that the French Salic law represents.  
In any case, it is possible to imagine other, more obviously worthy causes, at least from 
the perspective of an early modern Christian. Even Erasmus, for instance, who is for the most 
part an outspoken pacifist, makes an exception for armed resistance to Ottoman expansion. 
Henry points up this possibility in his marriage proposal to Katherine. “Shall not thou and I,” he 
says, “compound a boy, half French, half English, that shall go to Constantinople and take the 
Turk by the beard?” (5.2.203-6) As in the case of the Crusades which Henry’s father, Henry IV, 
hoped in vain to join, many of Shakespeare’s countrymen and perhaps even Shakespeare 
himself, depending on how one makes sense of Henry V, would have considered the restoration 
of greater Christendom in the Holy Land, if it were possible, a paradigmatic example of a 
legitimate justification for military action. Honour itself, however, especially at the cost of other 
Christians, was suspect. 
Shakespeare’s clearest attack on the intrinsic value of honour as a cue for war appears in 
Troilus and Cressida. Hector argues with considerable force that the Trojans should not support 
Paris’s adultery, then abruptly resolves, nonetheless, “to keep Helen still” for the sake of “our 
joint and several dignities” (2.1.191-3). Troilus agrees. “I would not wish a drop of Trojan blood 
/ Spent more in her defence” (2.1.197-8). “But,” he goes on, “she is a theme of honour and 
renown” (2.1.198-9). The volte-face in their reasoning is meant to be dubious; it is the same kind 
of self-deceptive casuistry Shakespeare often explores in his soliloquies.31 Shakespeare’s own 
perspective can be discerned in the ironic prologue, as well as the general tone of the play, 
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undercutting and de-glamorizing the legend of the Trojan War at every conceivable turn. “The 
princes orgulous,” the prologue proclaims, “their high blood chafed” (2): “orgulous” is 
deliberately over-the-top diction, setting up the anti-climax of “chafed.” The same pattern of 
deflation holds throughout. “The ravished Helen, Menelaus’ queen, / With wanton Paris sleeps, 
and that’s the quarrel” (9-10). “Quarrel” is a bathetic punchline; the end in this case, Shakespeare 
suggests, does not measure up to the means. 
Shakespeare’s most extensive criticism of violence in the name of honour can be found, 
however, in his depiction of ancient Rome. In Coriolanus and Titus Andronicus, the imperatives 
of honour lead to ongoing conflict between Rome and its neighbours, the Volscians and the 
Goths.  In Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra, as well as Coriolanus, dissatisfaction with 
anything less than absolute imperium, absolute individual command, leads to civil war within 
Rome itself. Enobarbus, for example, simply dismisses out of hand the very idea that Antony and 
Octavian might peacefully coexist. After Lepidus, a would-be peacemaker, fails and is disposed-
of, Enobarbus dryly remarks, “World, thou hast a pair of chaps, no more; / And throw between 
them all the food thou hast, / They’ll grind the one the other” (3.4.13-15). In like vein, St. 
Augustine uses Rome’s founders, Romulus and Remus, as a paradigmatic example of the 
“fratricide” which he sees at the heart of what he calls “the earthly city.” “Both desired to have 
the glory of founding the Roman republic, but both could not have as much glory as if only one 
claimed it; for he who wished to have the glory of ruling would certainly rule less if his power 
were shared” (15.5). 
 In his depiction of ancient Rome, Shakespeare echoes St. Augustine’s critique of the 
Romans in his City of God, which itself draws on the more secular Roman history of Sallust. At 
the beginning of this account of the war with Catiline, Sallust claims that ambition first entered 
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the world with the Persians, Athenians, and Spartans. These empires, he says, were the first “to 
subdue cities and nations, to make the lust for dominion [libido dominandi] a pretext for war, 
[and] to consider the greatest empire the greatest glory” (2.2). Citing this passage (3.14), St. 
Augustine seizes on Sallust’s concept of libido dominandi and recasts it as the defining feature of 
the Roman character. It is this quality, he argues, not Christianity, which was the cause of 
Rome’s inevitable self-immolation, as well as its initial, dazzling success. Elaborating on 
Sallust’s history, St. Augustine proposes that “the state [of Rome] grew with amazing rapidity” 
on account of its “desire for glory” and love of “domination” (5.12). Eventually this “vice,” 
however, led Rome into interminable civil wars (3.14). “This craving for sovereignty (libido ista 
dominandi),” he concludes, “disturbs and consumes the human race with frightful ills.” “How 
shall I speak in detail of the same wars, so often renewed in subsequent reigns, though they 
seemed to have been finished by great victories; and of wars that time after time were brought to 
an end by great slaughters, and which yet time after time were renewed by the posterity of those 
who had made peace and struck treaties?” (3.14; cp. 19.7; cp. 15.4) 
 In his retelling of the history of medieval England, as well as ancient Rome, Shakespeare 
presents something very like the problem of recurrent civil war which St. Augustine emphasizes 
in his City of God. Secular civilization as St. Augustine describes it there is by nature trapped in 
an incessant cycle of violence: “the earthly city is divided against itself” (15.5). As Freud says in 
Civilization and its Discontents, homo homini lupus: man is a wolf to man. A bit more hopeful 
perspective can be found, surprisingly, in Thomas Hobbes’ early treatise, On the Citizen: “There 
are two maxims which are surely both true: Man is a God to man and Man is a wolf to man. The 
former is true of the relations of citizens with each other, the latter of relations between 
commonwealths.”32 The development of international law in the wake of WWII was intended to 
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repair this incongruity; the record since then of deific international cooperation, however, has 
been mixed, at best. The phrase “forever war” first came to prominence in the 1970s, in 
connection with America’s involvement in Vietnam.33 The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, 
however, has proved even longer in duration; long enough for two generations of soldiers; 
perhaps in time even a third, now that President Trump has decided to maintain an American 
military presence in the region. A recent headline from The Onion, a satirical newspaper: 
“Soldier excited to take over father’s old Afghanistan patrol route.”34 A recent headline (not a 
joke) from the U. S. military newspaper, Stars and Stripes: “After years apart, military father and 
son catch up in Afghanistan.”35  
 St. Augustine would not be surprised. In our postlapsarian condition, he would say, peace 
is a rare and precarious state, constantly reverting back to internecine conflict. War is the norm, 
not peace, here in the City of Man. Shakespeare would probably agree. As Paul Jorgensen 
explains, “In Shakespeare’s usage peace tends to describe a political condition, a social 
atmosphere, more troubling and more provocative of human drama than its customary 
associations of concord and tranquillity.” Peace “tends to prevail as the play opens,” usually in 
“a decadent or unsound form.” War in contrast “comes almost always late in the play, and comes 
as an agent of resolution rather than unrest.”36 Working through a wide variety of contemporary 
sources, Jorgensen shows that this perspective on the relative merits of peace and war was far 
from exceptional. “In thus giving peace a frequently ominous or unwholesome connotation, 
Shakespeare was but sharing with his countrymen a pessimism induced by current political 
writings and events.” Like “most Elizabethans,” Jorgensen hastens to add, Shakespeare “did not 
like war.”37 His point is, rather, that Shakespeare’s fundamental vision of history is more 
Augustinian than utopian. To put it in present-day parlance, Shakespeare is on the side of John 
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Gray, rather than Steven Pinker.38 Pace the Beatles, as well as the Whigs, everything is not 
getting better all the time. As Gray writes, “Liberal civilization is not the emerging meaning of 
the modern world but a historical singularity that is inherently fragile.”39  
 Gray’s unspoken target in this case is most immediately Francis Fukuyama. 
“Civilization,” Gray insists, “is not the endpoint of modern history, but a succession of interludes 
in recurring spasms of barbarism.”40 In a hugely-influential, still-controversial essay in The 
National Interest, written in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, then later reworked 
into a book, The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argues that we are approaching the 
“end of history,” in which liberal democracy is the only intellectual option that appears 
legitimate, having triumphed over erstwhile rivals such as hereditary monarchy, fascism, and 
communism. Since then, the rise of radical Islam, including the suppression of the Green 
Revolution in Iran, the general failure of the Arab Spring, and the ongoing antidemocratic, 
Islamist turn in Turkish politics has, to say the least, made things more difficult for those who 
would defend Fukuyama’s thesis. Nevertheless, his more general sense of how history works, 
one that he derives from Hegel, does provide some useful insights into Shakespeare’s keen 
awareness of the connection between war and concepts of “honour.” 
 In brief, Fukuyama helpfully aligns three different ways of talking about more or less the 
same emotion. The part of Henry V that, as he says, leads him to “covet honour” is the same 
faculty of the soul that Plato describes as thymos and which he personifies in his Republic as a 
dedicated military caste. Fukuyama defines it as “man’s sense of self-worth and the demand that 
he be recognized.”41 That last word, “recognized,” is especially important; it reflects Fukuyama’s 
sense that what Shakespeare calls honour is a desire for what Hegel would call “recognition” 
(Anerkennung). In keeping with Hegel, as well as other, latter-day Hegelians such as Charles 
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Taylor and Axel Honneth, Fukuyama sees our desire to have our sense of ourselves 
acknowledged by other people as an innate, ineluctable, and very powerful human drive.42 Our 
effort to validate our own self-esteem is nothing less than “the motor of history.”43 What Axel 
Honneth calls the “struggle for recognition” is more important, in particular, than the social and 
economic conditions Marx calls “relations of production.”44 What people want most, more than 
any material sustenance, more than what Agamben calls “bare life,” is to feel respected; this 
desire for “recognition” (Anerkennung) is or should be the bedrock, the most fundamental 
ground, of all historicist explanation of human conflict.    
 In his essay for this special issue, “The Better Part of Stolen Valour: Counterfeits, 
Comedy, and the Supreme Court,” David Currell focuses on the “counterfeiting of military 
identity by an imposter who misappropriates the honour due to the valorous.” In the case of 
United States vs. Alvarez, Currell finds a modern counterpart to Shakespeare’s Falstaff or Pistol, 
who themselves reprise the classical figure of the miles gloriosus (braggart soldier). Within the 
United States, the Stolen Valour Act of 2005 had criminalized falsely claiming to have been 
awarded U. S. military honours. In 2012, however, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down on the 
Act on the grounds that it violated the defendant’s right to free speech, in keeping with the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Bill of Rights. Currell takes the opinions of the justices as a starting 
point to consider how honour is defined in Shakespeare’s plays, as well as classical sources such 
as Homer’s Iliad, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and Plautus’s Miles Gloriosus. In the ancient 
world, honour “cannot be shared without division.” Martial glory is a zero-sum accolade; one 
wins it at the cost of someone else. Community recognition of military accomplishment, 
understood in this light, leads to proportional material as well as emotional rewards. Fraudulent 
claims jeopardize the delicate balance of this system, which the state must maintain, in some 
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guise or other, in order to keep its military motivated. Honour is a valuable form of social 
capital; early modern England protected and policed its allocation through shaming, as we see in 
Shakespeare’s comic treatment of figures such as Parolles and Falstaff. In the case of the United 
States, after the Stolen Valor Act was struck down as unconstitutional, it was amended to allow 
false claims to military honours and instead criminalize gaining any kind of tangible benefit from 
such imposture. In effect, Currell concludes, “the dissenting and majority opinions in United 
States vs. Alvarez contest the question whether the civil repercussions of U. S. militarism belong 
to epic or comedy.”  
 As Hegel observes, the desire for recognition cannot be eradicated from the human 
psyche. No-one can be self-sufficient in that sense, not even Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, despite 
his strenuous efforts to escape his own need for validation. We all want honour of one kind or 
another.45 The key problem of politics, then, as Fukuyama suggests, is not to get rid of what 
Plato calls thymos altogether, but instead to channel it in a direction that is as conducive as 
possible to peace.  To help explain what he means, Fukuyama invents two terms. Isothymia is the 
desire to be recognized as equal and is compatible with peaceful coexistence. Megalothymia is 
the desire to be recognized as superior and eventually, inevitably leads to violence. For 
Fukuyama’s former supervisor, Samuel Huntington, the paradigmatic example of what 
Fukuyama would call a megalothymotic society in our own time is the Muslim world. As 
Huntington notoriously notes, “Islam has bloody borders.”46 For Shakespeare in contrast, as for 
St. Augustine, the paradigmatic example of what Fukuyama would call a megalothymotic society 
is ancient Rome. Fukuyama’s neologism, megalothymia, is essentially interchangeable with St. 
Augustine’s concept of libido dominandi, as well as perhaps Nietzsche’s not-unrelated concept 
of “the will to power.” 
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 In his City of God, St. Augustine defends Christianity against pagan accusations that it 
was the reason for the ongoing, alarming collapse of the Roman Empire. As St. Augustine sees 
that decline, Rome fell prey to its own unreconstructed will to power, torn apart and fatally 
weakened by internecine civil wars. In the Enlightenment, however, Edward Gibbon took up the 
pagan charge anew. By discouraging Romans’ traditional valour and ruthlessness, he argues, 
Christianity left them unable to resist the onslaught of various German tribes. Christian doctrines 
of “pusillanimity” led the once-indomitable Romans to become, as he says, “indolent” and 
“effeminate.” In his depiction of the Wars of the Roses, Shakespeare seems to set up a similar 
clash of possible interpretations. Why did England descend into civil war? 
 One answer can be found in the contrast between Henry V and his son, Henry VI, the two 
kings at the centre of Shakespeare’s two tetralogies of English history plays. Of the two, Henry 
V tends to draw more attention. For the last several decades, stage productions of Henry V have 
tended to use the play as an occasion to agitate against Western military involvement overseas, 
casting Henry in an unflattering light. If we want to understand Shakespeare’s own perspective, 
however, I would suggest that we hold off on criticism of Henry, unless we also address the 
manifest failure of his son, Henry VI, as well as the various fatal mistakes of another peace-
loving, pious royal heir: Hamlet. Otherwise, we run the risk of blaming Henry V personally and 
perhaps excessively for what Shakespeare himself might well see instead as the imperfect, fallen 
nature of the world itself: to read the context of Henry V, the political arena in which he exists, 
as if its evils were somehow products of his own particular character. 
 Within the Christian tradition, it is not an exaggeration to say that secular government is 
sometimes represented as a special province of the devil. When Christ is tempted in the 
wilderness, Satan offers him, as if they were his own to give, “all the kingdoms of the world, and 
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the glory of them” (Matt. 4:8). In keeping with this vision of “the earthly city,” for St. Augustine, 
any postlapsarian political order will inevitably fall short of the kingdom of heaven. Even at its 
best, for it to function at all, for it simply to exist, a secular state will require incessant, off-
putting moral compromise. The measure to keep in mind is up from anarchy, Hobbes’s bellum 
omnia contra omnes, rather than down from Kant’s “perpetual peace.” In light, then, of this 
pessimistic, Augustinian view of secular politics, Henry VI’s efforts at diplomacy seem quixotic, 
and his abstemious aversion to any kind of violence comes across as short-sighted: inadequate to 
the task of maintaining a viable peace. As Lord Clifford is dying, he lays the blame for 
England’s civil war squarely on its child-like, mild-mannered king.  
 
  Henry, hadst thou swayed as kings should do,  
Or as thy father and his father did,  
Giving no ground unto the house of York, 
They never had then sprung like summer flies! 
I and ten thousand in this luckless realm 
Had left no mourning widows for our death. (3 Henry VI, 2.6.14-19) 
 
Shakespeare depicts the reign of Henry VI, in other words, in much the same way that 
unsympathetic historians of American foreign policy now tend to describe the presidency of 
Jimmy Carter, back in the 1970s. Pious progressive naïveté about human rights and international 
norms, emerging out of an over-optimistic secularization of Christian principles, found itself 
caught off-guard, in the end, by ruthless Russian and Iranian Realpolitik.47 Henry VI, like Jimmy 
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Carter, makes a category error: he treats the City of Man as if it were the City of God, and it 
blows up in his face. 
 In his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Gibbon describes “the contempt and 
reproaches of the Pagans,” who, he explains, confronted by the rise of Christianity, “very 
frequently asked, what must be the fate of the empire, attacked on every side by barbarians, if all 
mankind should adopt the pusillanimous sentiments of this new sect?” (1.15) We today tend to 
be concerned about the danger of what Fukuyama calls megalothymia, which we see writ large in 
the figure of Shakespeare’s Henry V. It is also possible, however, to see cause for concern in the 
political implications of its polar opposite, a timid and retiring microthymia. What happens if an 
individual, or a nation, lacks the thymos necessary for effective self-defence?  “I am pigeon-
livered,” Hamlet complains, “and lack gall / To make oppression bitter” (2.2.512-13). In his 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle criticizes what he calls micropsychia (“smallness of soul,” “undue 
self-denigration”). In his Moralia, Plutarch introduces a parallel concept, dysōpia (lit., “lack of 
[inner] resources”).48  We might call it “fecklessness.” It denotes an inability to stand up for 
oneself; to resist importunity; to fight rather than concede. In his Life of Brutus, for instance, 
Plutarch complains that some men “dare deny nothing.” 
 This charge of dysōpia, “fecklessness,” seems fitting for Henry VI, and it is perhaps just 
as dangerous, if not more so, in its own more indirect fashion, as Henry V’s war to win back 
English territory in France. At least, Shakespeare seems to think so. A refusal to engage in power 
politics creates a power vacuum which is not necessarily an improvement: we might look, for 
instance, to present-day Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In Shakespeare’s first tetralogy, the chaos which 
Henry VI allows to consume the nation leads in time, and not by chance, to the rise of less-
scrupulous, genuinely frightening figures such as Richard III. For all his talk of the “end of 
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history,” Fukuyama for his part does worry, as his argument draws to a close, that efforts to 
excise all interest in military engagement from the moral universe of liberal democracies will 
leave them defenceless, in the end, against abiding enemies. The “last men of history,” he warns, 
will not survive if they allow themselves to become “men without chests.” As explanation, he 
cites Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “For thus you speak: ‘Real we are entirely, and without belief or 
superstition.’ Thus you stick out your chests – but alas, they are hollow!”49 
  With this problem of thymos in mind, it was fascinating to me to see how frequently 
former U. S. President Barack Obama was compared to Hamlet, when he was in office, as a way 
of criticizing his approach to foreign policy.50 The analogy could be found across the entire 
spectrum of opinion, left to right, foreign and domestic: Mitt Romney (“This is not the time for 
Hamlet in the White House”),51 The Guardian,52 The Huffington Post,53 National Review,54 The 
Weekly Standard,55 Commentary,56 Russia Today,57 The Times of Israel,58 Al Arabiya,59 and so 
on. In his essay for this special issue, “Hamletism in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,” Jésus 
Tronch considers a similar case of political appropriation. During the Spanish Civil War, 
newspaper articles, theatrical productions, and a novel by Paulino Masip, The Diary of Hamlet 
Garcia, Republican provocateurs sought to counter the perceived “Hamletism” of intellectuals: 
“ineffectuality, vacillation, or irresolution in social and political commitment.” The newspaper 
La Vanguardia, edited by Masip, sought to “stir the ‘inertia’ of some citizens” and to “dispel the 
moral qualms and problems of conscience which the ‘revolution’ posed to them.” José Bergamin 
in Hora de Espana tried to persuade them that “the essence of intelligence is in the faculty of 
deciding rather than hesitating.” A production of Hamlet in Valencia in 1937 tried to “hold the 
mirror” up to its own audience, critiquing them for their neglect of “urgent affairs.” Finally, in 
his novel, The Diary of Hamlet Garcia, written in retrospect from exile in Mexico, Masip reflects 
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upon the defeat of the Republican cause, brought about in part, he suggests, by intellectuals like 
his protagonist opting out of political engagement. 
 The accusations, like Masip’s, brought against President Obama that he was too akin to 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet are all the more interesting when weighed against the equally pervasive 
tendency to compare his predecessor, President George W. Bush, to Hamlet’s polar opposite, 
Henry V.60 What journalists criticized Obama for was not simply indecision, but more 
specifically a lack of “fire” or “passion” – I would say, a lack of thymos. They wanted, that is, 
the same kind of flashing-eye, fire-in-the-belly, impulsive, even reckless emotional engagement 
that they had criticized, not long before, in President Bush. Perhaps they were right on both 
counts. In any case, it is interesting to observe their ambivalence about the role of indignation in 
foreign policy, as well as their use of Shakespeare’s characters as a kind of shorthand. Given the 
change Fukuyama describes, the tendency of liberal democracies to attempt to tame or even 
eradicate thymos, we do not have a shared framework anymore for thinking clearly and explicitly 
about the role of honour in international relations.61 Journalists turn, therefore, to Shakespeare, 
and to an age in which it was more acceptable to talk about honour openly. Shakespeare’s kings, 
like the U. S. Presidents themselves, serve as helpful personifications of different approaches to 
managing, reconciling, and stabilizing our collective human desire for recognition. 
 In her essay for this special issue, “Where Character is King: Gregory Doran’s Henriad,” 
Alice Dailey reflects on her experience of attending the Royal Shakespeare Company’s recent 
“mega-event,” “King and Country: Shakespeare’s Great Cycle of Kings,” a production of all four 
plays of the second tetralogy in Stratford, London, China, and New York, directed by Gregory 
Doran and headlined by David Tennant in the role of Richard II. Dailey finds the productions 
surprisingly “modest, intimate,” “less interested in a conceptual engagement with politics or 
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monarchy than in an exploration of character.” The Histories Cycle directed by Doran’s 
predecessor at the RSC, Michael Boyd, a decade earlier, which included both tetralogies, “made 
elaborate use of conceptual casting, stylized battle scenes, trapeze, prop recycling and ghostly 
reappearance to create thematic coherence.” Doran in contrast eschewed “design-driven staging” 
and “conceptual intervention” in favour of an emphasis on “subtle characterization” and 
“ensemble acting.” This decision, Dailey observes, helps to clarify “the inadequacy of 
conventional literary-critical hermeneutics for describing theatrical performance,” in keeping 
with the concerns of performance scholars W. B. Worthen and Andrew James Hartley, as well as 
Rebecca Schneider’s sense of the limitations of archival evidence, which inevitably tend to 
foreground “design or concept.” In the case of “the Richard-Aumerle kiss scene” in Doran’s 
Richard II, for example, “the ephemeral, emotive present” is “the essential content of the 
production,” a form of “subtle character work” which it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to record 
on video or in still photos.  
 Other choices about characterization, however, Dailey argues, proved less effective. 
Dailey questions young actor Alex Hassel’s “nice-guy portrayal of Henry V” as “figuring out his 
warrior-king role on the fly,” especially, his performance of the “I know you all” speech from 1 
Henry IV as an “epiphany,” as well as his representation of Henry’s dismissal of Falstaff as an 
anxious, hurried, reluctant recitation of a set speech the king has learned by rote.  Dailey see this 
interpretation as too incongruent with her own sense from the text itself of Prince Hal as 
calculating, cold-hearted, and cynical. “By suggesting Henry’s spontaneous discovery of his role, 
the production attempted to sanitize the character of premeditation or strategy.” In light of this 
perceived “dissonance” between text and performance, Dailey sees some limitations to Doran’s 
approach. “What hampered the cycle’s presentation of Henry was its prioritization of emotional 
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immediacy over the production script’s built-in formal mechanisms for constituting character, 
such as typology, structural juxtaposition, and the diachronic accretion of habitual action.”  
 Is Henry V a “good guy” or a “bad guy”? The debate has become in practice a 
synecdoche for a larger question: was Shakespeare a pacifist? More broadly speaking, was 
Shakespeare a progressive? Steven Marx argues that Shakespeare changes his mind; he starts out 
pro-war in his early plays and ends up anti-war in his late plays. Like Quabeck, however, I think 
it is possible to discern a fairly consistent compromise position on the ethics of war running 
throughout all of his plays, akin to and perhaps informed by the positions typical of 
contemporary just war theory: a reconciliation of the real and the ideal grounded in the Christian 
doctrine of the Fall of Man, as well as Aristotle’s sense of ethics as inherently and at best only 
approximate and circumstantial. According to this perspective, which in Shakespeare’s context 
would have been the norm, war is at times a necessary evil, the least-worst solution, given the 
fallenness of human nature.  
To use the technical language of law, as well as theology, the ethics of war as 
Shakespeare sees it is an ethics of equity. Calvin develops this concept in his early commentary 
on Seneca’s De Clementia, in which he distinguishes equity, the individual application of a law, 
from summum ius, the fullness or strict letter of law. Christian theology does tend to present 
pacifism as an ethical ideal. In keeping with the principle of equity, however, Christian 
theologians also grant that violence is sometimes acceptable; even necessary; magistrates have a 
responsibility to protect the innocent from injury. In his Institutes, for example, Calvin writes, 
“both natural equity [naturalis aequitas] and the nature of the office dictate that princes must be 
armed not only to restrain the misdeeds of private individuals, but also to defend by war the 
domains entrusted to their safekeeping, if at any time they are under attack” (4.20.11). 
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  As St. Augustine explains in his City of God, “the wise man will wage just wars”; 
“wrongdoing of the other party” sometimes compels him to do so. Nevertheless, he will “lament” 
the “necessity” of any violence he brings to bear (19.7). Wars bring the Christian soldier grief, 
insofar as they are a manifestation of man’s persistent wickedness; his more general propensity 
for sin. This perspective casts Shakespeare’s Henry V in a different light. As Peter Phialas 
writes, “the king is not the ruthless Machiavellian that some critics take him to be.” Henry “has 
no choice in the rejection of Falstaff or the execution of the traitor.” “It does not follow,” 
therefore, that he “fails to experience real pain in passing judgment.” “Actions on the king’s part 
are made to underscore the tragic element in Shakespeare’s – and King Henry’s – conception of 
the royal dilemma.”62 Seen from this Augustinian perspective, Shakespeare’s Henry V, like his 
father before him, ends up isolated and sad, not because he is evil, but because Shakespeare sees 
politics as inherently tragic. There is no hidden, progressive solution; no better alternative that 
Henry somehow missed; no escaping from the grim necessity of moral compromise. We today 
tend to want to believe otherwise. But I am not sure Shakespeare would share our optimism.    
 
Patrick Gray 
Durham University 
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